What could the Mets look like at different budgets?

On Wednesday, I looked at where the Mets’ payroll stands right now, with a player payroll of around $245 million and a luxury tax payroll of around $276 million. Today, let’s examine a few possible paths for the Mets this winter based on how much they’re willing to spend in free agency. In each scenario, I’m considering the Mets’ needs to be, in some order:

• At least one starting pitcher, but preferably two or three
• At least two relief pitchers, but preferably three or four
• A starting-level corner outfielder or designated hitter

What kind of team can the Mets build while getting under the luxury tax in 2024 ($237 million)?

Not much of one. The Mets are currently $39 million over the initial luxury tax threshold. To get under, they’d need to trade Pete Alonso and Starling Marte, attaching a prospect of note to the latter to get out from the majority of what Marte is owed the next two seasons. They might need to move José Quintana and/or Jeff McNeil on top of that. So no, this is not a realistic option.

What kind of team can the Mets build without sacrificing future draft position ($277 million)?

If we agree the Mets can’t realistically get under the initial luxury tax threshold, the next meaningful target for them would be $277 million. Staying under that number would mean their first July 2025 draft pick would not drop by 10 spots.

Again, the Mets are already at $276 million against the luxury tax, so this would require either rolling the ball out with the squad that finished last season or being creative. The latter probably means turning Alonso and his salary — MLB Trade Rumors estimates it at about $22 million in the final year of his arbitration — into multiple younger, cost-controlled pieces, probably on the pitching side.

The argument for a $277 million payroll: If the goal is sustainability here, and if 2025 and 2026 are the real targets for contention, then taking a step back in 2024 serves that larger vision. The benefit in trading Alonso wouldn’t be preserving your draft position but rather the young, cost-controlled talent you could get back, which would allow you to spend more elsewhere on the roster in the future.

The argument against a $277 million payroll: “I don’t know that I would ever say that a year here should be a reset year,” David Stearns said the day he was introduced, and he was right. The Mets have already managed to disappoint, albeit in wildly different ways, in each of Steve Cohen’s first three seasons as owner. Trading a franchise cornerstone leading into a bridge year to save draft position or add a prospect or two sends the wrong message not just to fans, but to the current roster.

What kind of team can the Mets build for the same total investment as 2023 ($360 million)?

The Mets entered 2023 with an Opening Day payroll of around $340 million and a luxury tax payroll of close to $380 million. Luxury tax surcharges brought their total investment (player payroll plus tax surcharges) close to $445 million. So what kind of team could the Mets build with a total financial outlay of around $445 million?

The luxury tax penalties are harsher for a team going over the threshold for a third time rather than a second; if the Mets exceed the tax by the same amount this year as last, it’ll cost them an additional $25 million. So the player payroll will have to sit around $330 million and the luxury tax payroll around $360 million to match the same total investment. That gives the Mets about $82 million to spend from this point forward.

That should be enough room to bring in both Shohei Ohtani and Yoshinobu Yamamoto to supplement the lineup and rotation. There might be enough left over to add one more bullpen piece. While the big-ticket way of going about it is the most exciting to fans, it’s not Stearns’ mode of operation. He talked about building out depth at his intro press conference, and this approach would leave the Mets shallow once again.

The Mets could also eschew — or be turned down by — Ohtani and consider Yamamoto their big get. They could use the large chunk of cash that would have gone to Ohtani on several smaller pieces: a pair of mid-range starters (like Jack Flaherty and Lance Lynn), a corner outfielder (like Adam Duvall) and maybe a reliever or two. Or they could go all in on depth and sign neither Ohtani nor Yamamoto, bringing in three mid-range starters, a corner outfielder, a DH and multiple relievers.

The argument for a $360 million payroll: Either version of this team is one that can seriously contend in the National League. The one built on stars would be as formidable as any come October (should it arrive there), and the one built on depth would be better able to withstand injuries and underperformance than the 2023 Mets.

The argument against a $360 million payroll: This is not a team you’d expect to seriously challenge for the division title, which means playing in the Wild Card Series next year and hoping to get hot in October. Being this aggressive in free agency would undercut the plan seemingly put in place at the trade deadline.

What kind of team can the Mets build for the total investment they almost made with Carlos Correa aboard ($388 million)?

Had the Mets gone through with their 12-year, $315 million deal with Carlos Correa last December and concluded their offseason the same way they did in reality, they would have entered the 2023 season with a luxury-tax payroll sitting just below $400 million. With fees, their total investment would have landed at $495 million. Again, this year’s larger luxury-tax penalties would mean a luxury-tax payroll of about $388 million, giving New York a total of $110 million to spend this winter.

The odds are that Cohen is not comfortable running his budget that high this year, given the minuscule reward for his investment last winter. Still, if he thought the right pieces were there to go to the same lengths, what could it buy the Mets?

Well, now there’s less of a tradeoff between stars and depth. The Mets could add Ohtani, Yamamoto and other pieces of note — maybe Jordan Montgomery or Blake Snell for the rotation along with a corner outfielder. If they can’t work out a deal with Ohtani, they can add Yamamoto and a lot of other noteworthy free agents.

The argument for a $388 million payroll: This is probably the only way you land Ohtani and still have enough cash to build around him. (Indeed, that should be the primary pitch to land Ohtani: “The Mets are the team that can pay you what you’re worth and still have enough cash to build around you.”) New York’s failures in 2023 were hardly confined to its big investments, so Cohen and the front office shouldn’t shy away from being aggressive again.

The argument against a $388 million payroll: This is even more money to spend and still enter 2024 as an underdog in the division. (There is no amount of money the Mets can spend this winter to dethrone Atlanta as the NL East frontrunners come next spring, and it’s debatable how easily they can surpass Philadelphia in most projections.)

What kind of team can the Mets build if they’re trying hard to get under the luxury tax in 2025?

Right now, the Mets are about 60 percent of the way to the 2025 luxury tax threshold ($241 million) with guarantees to just six players. So even getting under next season is not easy.

This plan probably starts with not signing Alonso long-term, which leads you to contemplate trading him either this winter or at the trade deadline. It continues with a bunch of short-term deals in free agency, eschewing Ohtani, Yamamoto and all others at the top of the free-agent class. There are plenty of available starters and enough corner outfielders to find decent ones on a short-term deal. New York could also be a little creative: For instance, the Mets could sign right-hander Tyler Mahle to a two-year deal, anticipating Mahle would miss a large chunk of 2024 before returning in 2025; spreading the deal over two years lowers the luxury tax hit in ’25.

The argument for trying to get under the luxury tax in 2025: The Mets’ success in 2024 is going to depend less on what they do this winter in free agency than on what they do this winter in development. In other words, the growth of players such as Francisco Alvarez, Brett Baty, Ronny Mauricio and Mark Vientos is more important than signing someone long-term in free agency.

The argument against trying to get under the luxury tax in 2025: The only luxury-tax threshold the Mets should maybe care about is the one that drops their draft pick 10 slots, emphasis on maybe. The other penalties are all financial, and Cohen can absorb them. The Mets didn’t end up with a 75-87 team in 2023 because they signed the wrong kinds of long-term deals; they’ve played the short-term game (albeit the high-end, short-term game) and been hindered by it. The 2024 team would be better with a long-term commitment to the right person here and there, and the 2025 and 2026 teams won’t be materially better if the Mets reset their tax penalties.

What does all this mean?

Of course, the likeliest path for Stearns and the Mets is not any one of these specific outlines. It’s spending somewhere between where the roster is now and where the budget went last year, and it’s building out depth rather than focusing on star acquisitions. Stearns and Cohen have said as much publicly.

• The luxury tax threshold should not be a consideration for this team for 2024 or 2025.
• The Mets are going to have to choose, at some point, between adding high-end stars or building out their depth.
• The Mets’ needs do, in general, align with what the free-agent market can offer.